The 802nd Chemical Company on Guam, Feb. 1945

Eighty years ago, on February 3rd, 1945, the 802nd Chemical Company (Air Operations) participated in the official opening of North Field on Guam. They had arrived on Guam just two weeks earlier, assigned to establish and operate a “Class V Air Chemical Ammunition Depot” supporting the B-29s of the 314th Bomb Wing, XXI Bomber Command. Commander of the XXI, Gen. Curtis LeMay, was also at the ceremony, where everyone watched the arrival of the Wing’s first B-29s. Like other Chemical Companies on the nearby islands of Tinian and Saipan and in far-off India, the 802nd was an essential link in a supply chain that provided the U.S. Army Air Forces with access to two vitally important “weapons of mass destruction.”

The four commissioned officers and 130 enlisted men of the 802nd were fully qualified to provide the type of weapon the American public had feared most as WWII began. The unit had been established in May 1941, with early duties that included teaching soldiers and civilians in New Hampshire how to defend against German poison gas attacks. In mid-1944, the 802nd worked at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, loading 467 tons of mustard agent onto planes to test aerial spray techniques—handling more mustard, they reported, than was used in all WWI. If President Roosevelt had given the order, the 802nd and the other 66,000 men of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) could have helped deliver a massive attack with toxic chemicals. On Guam, however, Gen. LeMay was preparing to use a different weapon, one that was also developed and supplied by the CWS. On Guam, the 802nd worked only with incendiary bombs.

Fire bombs, of course, are one of the very oldest military weapons, dating back to “Greek Fire” and beyond. Their use during WWII was greatly advanced by J. Enrique Zanetti, a chemistry professor at Columbia University and reserve officer in the CWS. Zanetti argued almost alone in the early years of WWII that fire could be more effective than either toxic chemicals or high explosives in degrading an enemy’s will and ability to wage war. He further contended that the goal of using fire in modern “all-out war” was to start conflagrations on the scale of Mrs. O’Leary’s Chicago Fire and that the best way to start those massive fires was with a large number of small incendiary bombs. By February 1945, LeMay’s weapon of choice was clusters of 6-pound M69 bombs. Each M69 bomb was designed to penetrate the roof of a building before it exploded on the floor and spread flaming napalm upwards and outwards.

To store incoming shipments of incendiary bombs, the 802nd carved a depot out of the jungle. In operation, the depot remained bordered by jungle on two sides, and nighttime sightings of remnant Japanese troops were common. A third side of the incendiary depot bordered a separate depot for high-explosive bombs managed by the 1933rd Ordnance Ammunition Company. The fourth side of the incendiary depot opened onto the base itself. The 802nd and the 1933rd often worked together, particularly sharing bomb cranes before the 802nd received all its heavy equipment. They also worked together on February 11 when two small Navy planes collided overhead, one crashing into the nearby jungle and the other into the Ordnance Company’s depot. Both pilots were killed, and several ordnance men were injured, one of whom later died from his injuries. The unsuccessful attempt to help the pilot who had crashed into the jungle revealed a Japanese “knee mortar” with ammunition that had been left not far from the two bomb depots.

On 25 February 1945 (22 days after the opening of Guam’s North Field), B-29s from the XXI Bomber Command dropped 400 tons of clustered M69s on Tokyo. The planes came from the 6th and 9th Bomb Groups (part of the 73rd Bomb Wing on Tinian) and the newly arrived 19th Bomb Group (part of the 314th Bomb Wing). This raid was the first major shift in the Pacific from precision bombing with high explosives to area bombing with incendiaries, but it followed the old pattern of daylight bombing from high altitude. The raid destroyed or damaged about a square mile of Tokyo and convinced Gen. LeMay that firestorms were the correct approach. The bombs scattered well beyond the target area, however, convincing LeMay that future attacks should be at night and at lower altitudes.

Although the air bases in the Mariana Islands were still short of incendiary bombs and B-29s, LeMay moved forward with his strategy on the night of March 9. The massive firestorm which resulted in the densely populated Shitamachi district of Tokyo was likely the deadliest air raid of World War II. The district contained few large military or industrial targets, but it did include many small factories that supported Japan’s war effort, and it was home to many of the workers in Japan’s military factories. The mission leader was Brig. Gen. Power, Commander of the 314th Bomb Wing, who LeMay considered his best Wing leader. LeMay wanted to lead the raid in person, but he had been briefed on the atomic bombs, and the U.S. was unwilling to take any chance of LeMay being captured. Other raids followed quickly on Tokyo and other cities until the XXI Command had exhausted its supply of incendiary bombs.

The 280 tons of bombs that the 802nd Chemical Company prepared for the March 9th attack were again clusters of 6-pound M69 bombs. Writing later on the part played by the 802nd in the Tokyo Firestorm, 1st Lt. Edgar H. Moorhead described the heavy labor of opening crates and loading bombs.

“During the now famous 10-day blitz on Japan in March, this organization worked a peak of 36 consecutive hours without a break. When I say this organization, I mean every man. One of the crews that turned out the most bombs for the big raid of Tokyo was a crew of cooks headed by Captain Eden T. Pray, the C.O. of the unit. On that particular night only two men were left in the Company Area and they were both crippled. Of the 130 EM and 4 officers, there were 128 EM and 4 officers swinging axes or loading bombs. With this sort of all-out effort, the 802nd Chemical Company is able to say that no plane was ever held back from a mission for want of the incendiary bombs we were handling.”

There is room for disagreement about many aspects of World War Two. I hope no one will fail to agree that the men of the 802nd Chemical Company acted heroically and that they deserve far more credit than they have received for helping bring an end to that horrible war. Each soldier who served in the 802nd has a story that deserves to be honored. The account here may someday be part of a book, and some small pieces are already available at www.fold3.com. You might find the stories of twin brothers Pfc. Edgar Henry Hoops (35346753) and Pfc. Elroy William Hoops (35346766) to be an interesting place where you could do original research of your own. I have posted a roster of the men who were with the 802nd in February 1945 with rank, serial number, and job specialty at https://www.toxinsandfire.com/802cp. I would love to see others join in investigating this part of our history as recorded by the men who lived it. The full 1671 pages of the Organizational History Reports from the 802nd are available through a link at https://www.toxinsandfire.com/sources, along with similar reports from other U.S. Chemical Companies.